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How does the endogenous formation of market
structure change if we allow for strategic alliances
between firms?
The Question
Three stage entry game in which market structure is determined
endogenously by the levels of sunk cost R&D investments by firms.
Firms first choose to enter the market and upon entry make a deterministic
fixed (sunk) investments in quality along some set of research trajectories..In
the final stage, firms compete in quantity in the product market.
Consumers get utility from both the amount of the good they consume as
well as the quality associated with the good.
Firms can attain a given level of quality by pursuing their own R&D and
incurring a sunk cost which is increasing in the level of quality. Alternatively,
firms can license quality from a rival, incurring a minimum setup cost, a
transactions cost, and a fixed-fee royalty payment, expressed as a percentage
of sales from the associated product.
Market structure is determined endogenously by solving for a configuration
of qualities under which all active firms, both licensors and licensees, earn
positive profits net of sunk R&D investments such that all profitable entry
opportunities are realized.
We develop a model of endogenous market structure and
sunk cost R&D investment that allows for the licensing of
technology among competitors. Our theoretical model
predicts both a greater lower bound to market
concentration and higher levels of quality compared to
the case without licensing. These results imply that in
markets in which licensing and asymmetric R&D costs are
prevalent, such as the agricultural biotechnology sector,
the ability to license technology generates more
concentration among firms but also improves consumer
welfare by incentivizing the production of higher quality.
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Motivation
The introduction of licensing raises the lower bound to
market concentration in an endogenous sunk cost industry.
There are incentives for a firm with R&D cost advantages
to escalate its levels of quality and recoup the costs via
royalty payments from licensees.
The effect of licensing on consumer welfare is ambiguous:
decreasing in concentration, but increasing in the quality.
Model
Abstract
Despite increasing adoption rates and market size, an
increase in firm entry has not been observed in the
agricultural biotechnology sector.
Concentration ratios have decreased only gradually even
though the domestic market has been growing steadily.
The relaxation of “anti-stacking” provisions has led to an
increase in the observed number of licensing and cross-
licensing agreements among agricultural input firms.































































Figure 1: Concentration Ratios
(i) and Market Size








Source: (i) Author’s calculations (Data retrieved from the Field Tests Database, Biotechnology Regulatory Services, APHIS, USDA);
(ii) Retrieved from calculations of Fernandez-Cornejo (2009) “Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.” (Source data from NASS June Agricultural Survey, NASS, USDA).
Adaption of 
Sutton (1998) Results from a duopoly quality-quantity choice model
imply that consumer welfare is greatest if firms with
asymmetric costs are able to license their technology.
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